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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

In this age of digital music, online-movie streaming, and rapidly advancing
technology, the need for a revised Copyright Act is no secret. 1 Even Maria Pallante, the
Register of Copyrights and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office, has spoken about the
need for sweeping change, stating: “[T]here comes a time the subject ‘ought to be dealt
with as a whole, and not by further merely partial or temporizing amendments.’” 2 While
Ms. Pallante was speaking broadly of the need for in-depth revision of the Copyright Act, 3
this Note focuses on a subset of the Copyright Act: the First Sale Doctrine (the Doctrine),
which grants certain rights to purchasers of copyrighted material. More specifically, this
Note focuses on both the need for a revision of the Doctrine, and what a revision to this
Doctrine might look like.
Currently, the Doctrine is too rigid in the face of evolving modern technology. The
Doctrine was written at a time when copies of a work were tangible and burdensome to
make, while today digital copies can be made with just the click of a button. Because of
this change, a formalist application of the Doctrine often produces absurd results, harming
both copyright holders and consumers. Instead, a functionalist approach to the Doctrine
and a more flexible rule are needed to address these technological advances, which were
unforeseen when the Doctrine was first introduced.
Part II begins the analysis by exploring the statutory landscape of copyright law as it
relates to the Doctrine. Part III examines two recent cases interpreting the Doctrine:
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons 4 and Capitol Records v. ReDigi. 5 Part IV analyzes these
decisions and explores the potential effects that the decisions might have on the secondhand
market, black market, and pirated goods generally. Part V discusses the considerations and
challenges that must be addressed when crafting a new rule. Finally, Part VI suggests a
more flexible Doctrine, using a functionalist approach to resolve some of the problems that
have arisen—and continue to arise—with the current Doctrine as technology advances.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

¶4

History of the Copyright Act and First Sale Doctrine

Congressional authority for the Copyright Act comes from Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, whose purpose is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 6 The first Copyright Act was enacted in
1790, permitting authors to obtain a fourteen-year copyright for “maps, charts, and books,”
which granted exclusive rights to “print, reprint, publish, or vend” the authors’ respective

See Ted Johnson, Register to Call for Major Revision to Copyright Law, VARIETY (Mar. 19, 2013),
http://variety.com/2013/digital/news/register-to-call-for-major-revision-to-copyright-law-1200326105/.
2
Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 319 (2013) (quoting
Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 YALE L.J. 48, 62 (1926)).
3
See id.
4
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
5
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
6
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1
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works. 7 The Copyright Act was amended in 1831 to include musical compositions and to
extend the copyright term to twenty-eight years for all works. 8
In 1908, the Supreme Court established the First Sale Doctrine in Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Straus, holding that:
[O]ne who has sold a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted
with all right to control the sale of it. The purchaser of a book, once sold by
authority of the owner of a copyright, may sell it again, although he could
not publish a new edition of it. 9

¶6

In essence, the Doctrine establishes that once a copyrighted work is sold, the initial
purchaser may dispose of the work as she sees fit, as long as she does not copy the original
work. Further, the Court held that giving notice of a restriction on future sales was
insufficient, and that such a restriction applies only to parties in privity of contract. 10 For
more than half a century, the Doctrine derived its authority from common law, until the
Copyright Act of 1976 officially codified this longstanding legal maxim. 11
Three sections in the Copyright Act of 1976 are particularly important to this Note.
The first is § 106, which grants authors exclusive rights in their works, such as the right to
control the reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works. 12 The second is § 109,
which codifies the Doctrine. 13 Section 109 goes on to describe other exceptions—and
Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, Ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
9
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
10
Id.
11
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 109, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 109
(2012)).
12
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). Section 106 provides authors exclusive rights:
7
8

(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
Id. Each of the § 106 exclusive rights is crucial in deciding if and how new services and technologies
infringe on authors’ copyrights. This Note, however, focuses primarily on the exclusive rights to making
and distributing copies of copyrighted works, which a revised Doctrine would most directly implicate.
13
17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). Section 109 codifies the Doctrine, stating:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of [§] 106(3), the owner of a particular copy
or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord. . . .
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exceptions to those exceptions—that apply specifically to computer software. 14 The third
is § 602, which outlines rules for the importation and exportation of copyrighted works. 15
Specifically, § 602 provides that importing copyrighted works acquired outside of the
United States without the copyright holder’s consent constitutes an infringement of the
author’s exclusive rights under § 106. 16 Section 602 then lists specific exceptions to this
prohibition on importation, 17 including importation under government authority, personal
use not intended for distribution, and importation by or for organizations with scholarly,
educational, or religious purposes. 18 Understanding how these three provisions relate is
essential to any analysis of the Doctrine and its application.
B.
¶7

Legal Distinctions Between Print and Digital Media

Although courts and Congress have recognized that digital media may require special
treatment, 19 the current Doctrine, as a whole, nevertheless applies to print and digital media
alike. 20 Yet the Doctrine was codified long before digital media’s inception. New copyright
issues continue to emerge from the increased prevalence of digital media, posing
difficulties that require courts to interpret this archaic Doctrine in light of modern
realities. 21 Two of these issues—licensing and protective software—illustrate the
complexities and nuances that arise in the digital copyright context, and how drafting
legislation that addresses evolving technology is uniquely difficult. Subsection (1)
evaluates § 109’s amendment limiting the Doctrine’s application to computer programs,
and how this targeted legislation affected, and continues to affect, software providers and
end-users. Subsection (2) addresses the use of digital rights management (DRM)
technology, which protects software from unlawful replication, and how Congress’s
attempt to devise a legislative solution fell short of achieving its intended result. In the end,
....
(b)(1)(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), unless authorized by
the owners of copyright in the sound recording or the owner of copyright in a computer
program . . . and in the case of a sound recording in the musical works embodied therein,
neither the owner of a particular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular
copy of a computer program . . . may, for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial
advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that phonorecord or
computer program . . . by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice in the
nature of rental, lease, or lending.
Id. § 109 (a)–(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 109 (b)(1)(B)–(b)(2). While these are important parts of the Copyright Act, the intricacies of
computer licensing extend beyond the intended scope of this Note.
15
17 U.S.C. § 602 (2012).
16
Id. § 602(a)(1).
17
Id. § 602(a)(3).
18
Section 602, and specifically the exception for scholarly and educationally organizations, was
particularly important in the Kirtsaeng decision discussed infra Part III. In that case, the U.S. Supreme
Court confronted the issue of whether the Doctrine’s geographical reach extends to foreign-produced
books, which, as evinced by the conflicting opinions, ultimately highlights the need for the Doctrine’s
statutory revision. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
19
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), 1201.
20
See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
21
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Some New Kinds of Authorship Made Possible by Computers and Some
Intellectual Property Questions They Raise, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 685 (1992).
14
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both scenarios provide guidance as to how legislation could rectify the Doctrine’s current
flaws.
1. Licensing
¶8

One of the first questions to surface with the Doctrine’s application to modern
technology involved computer software. 22 Congress amended § 109 to limit the Doctrine’s
applicability to computer software. 23 Unless permitted by the copyright holder, no “person
in possession of a particular copy of a computer program . . . [may] dispose of . . . [a]
computer program . . . by rental, lease, or lending.” 24 This allows the owner of a copyright
in software to maintain his exclusive distribution rights with respect to renting, leasing, or
lending the software program.
¶9
Copyright holders who qualify for this exception often employ form contracts, or
end-user license agreements (EULAs), 25 which can be modified to “permit the contracting
flexibility that is essential for today’s software products.” 26 Typically included within
software packaging or displayed on a computer screen, 27 an end-user agrees to the contract
by performing a certain act, such as by opening the box or clicking a button. 28
¶10
Although these “contracts of adhesion” have garnered much criticism, 29 EULAs
often grant legal rights to consumers that they otherwise would not have had. 30 For
instance, EULAs might grant consumers the right to distribute materials using certain fonts
from a word-processing program or the right to make, copy, and sell derivative works using
sample source code. 31 EULAs allow software providers to protect their innovative
technology from exploitative uses, which, without § 109’s restrictions, would
impermissibly limit end-users’ rights under the Doctrine. 32 And while software providers
could ostensibly negotiate with each purchaser, the transaction costs of doing so would
hinder the dissemination of this beneficial technology by increasing market prices.
¶11
In sum, EULAs both protect copyrights from infringement and grant distinct rights
to consumers. Without over burdening end-users, these licensing schemes provide
flexibility for innovators and thus facilitate technological development, illustrating how
specifically tailored legislation can resolve issues that arise from the application of
antiquated law to novel innovation.
See id.
17 U.S.C. § 109(b).
24
Id. § 109(b)(1)(A).
25
See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Software
License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335, 339 (1996).
26
Id. at 366.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. “The increasing ability to expand protection for copyrighted works through the use of nonnegotiable ‘contracts’ is troublesome . . . . [J]ustifications for this contract-based approach are based on
assumptions about contract formation that are not present in the modern software industry. . . . [I]t is a
threat to the delicate balance of public policy that supports intellectual property law.” Craig Zieminski,
Game Over for Reverse Engineering?: How the DMCA and Contracts Have Affected Innovation, 13 J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 289, 330 (2008).
30
Zieminski, supra note 29, at 354–55.
31
Id.
32
See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
22
23
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2. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
¶12

Digital rights management (DRM) technology is another way to protect copyrighted
digital works from exploitation. 33 DRM technology prevents users from making copies of
copyrighted digital works without a password. 34 However, in the 1990s, as parties began
developing DRM technology, others attempted to devise DRM-circumvention technology,
often with much success. 35
¶13
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to combat
the proliferation of DRM-circumvention technology, criminalizing the production,
distribution, or use of services aimed at bypassing these access controls. 36 Importantly, as
the DMCA currently stands, the threshold for violating the DMCA is lower than that for
copyright infringement. 37 Although a bill was recently introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives requiring an actual copyright violation to occur for liability under the
DMCA to arise, it never reached a vote, meaning that the use of a DRM-disabling program
or device is currently illegal unless one of the few anti-circumvention exemptions apply. 38
¶14
The DMCA’s reach extends far beyond its likely intended scope, criminalizing
certain uses of software that qualify as fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107. 39 Because of this
broad scope, many argue that the DMCA actually stifles the development of DRM
technology. For example, unwary academics researching DRM-circumvention software
can easily violate the DMCA unintentionally, which in turn deters beneficial research. 40
One commentator noted:
The science of cryptography depends on cryptographers’ ability to
exchange ideas in code, to test and refine those ideas . . . . By
communicating with other researchers and testing each others’ work,
cryptographers can improve the technologies they work with, discard those
that fail, and gain confidence in technologies that have withstood repeated
testing. 41

Victor Mayer-Schonberger, Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights with DRM, 84 DENV. U.
L. REV. 181, 181 (2006).
34
Id. at 182.
35
Id. at 184–85 (“To break out of this straight-jacket, many tools have been developed and remain
available on the Internet to either strip the music from FairPlay restriction data, or to otherwise enable the
unauthorized sharing of DRMed music content. Creating, disseminating and using such tools may be
potentially illegal, but nevertheless continues to take place.”).
36
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
37
See id.; cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
38
Unlocking Technology Act of 2013, H.R. 1892, 113th Cong. (2013).
39
Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501,
509 (2003).
40
Id. at 503 (“Thus, even though academic encryption researchers can continue to conduct and publish
some of their research under the DMCA without significant practical risk of criminal or civil liability, the
DMCA significantly affects the manner in which that research is conducted.”).
41
Id. at 511 n.37 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Dr. Steven Bellovin et al. at 14, Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-9185), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/NY/appeals/010126-cryptographers-amicus.pdf).
33
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Unlike the amendment to § 109, the DMCA’s over-inclusive scope has created a chilling
effect on independent research, which is a necessary component for improving anticircumvention technology. 42 The DMCA’s innovation-stymieing impact likely outweighs
the benefits stemming from its deterrent effect. 43
¶15
In addition, the DMCA limits online service providers’ liability for copyright
infringement committed by their users. 44 Consequently, the DMCA provides strict
copyright protection in that it applies to any action meant to circumvent DRM technology
regardless of whether a copyright violation actually occurred. But at the same time, the
DMCA makes detecting and punishing digital copyright violations more difficult by
excluding service providers from its reach, instead focusing primarily on the innumerable,
widely-dispersed, and effectively anonymous individuals attempting to circumvent DRM
technology. 45 Ultimately, the DMCA’s over-inclusiveness and rigid mandate serve as a
cautionary tale for any subsequent attempts to regulate evolving technology.
III. KIRTSAENG & REDIGI
¶16

Part III turns to the Doctrine’s current application. Part III(A) analyzes the most
relevant case, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., and explores the reasoning behind the
differing opinions. Part III(B) then discusses Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi, Inc.—an
ongoing case before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York—which,
read in tandem with Kirtsaeng, suggests that unintended consequences, ranging from
increased piracy to heightened financial burdens for libraries, are likely to result without a
change to the Doctrine.
A.

¶17

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

In Kirtsaeng, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether reselling imported,
foreign-produced textbooks violated copyright law. 46 John Wiley & Sons (Wiley), a global
provider of educational solutions and products, often publishes textbooks through its
network of wholly owned subsidiaries in Asia. 47 In this case, Wiley claimed that it retained
the copyrights to all works published abroad, which were identical to the American
versions except for a copyright notice in the foreign-produced books stating:
See id. at 509–10.
See Zieminski, supra note 29, at 324 (“[B]ecause of the intertwined nature of idea and expression
within software, and because of the gatekeeper function performed by access control measures, new
restrictions on reverse engineering allow parties to monopolize ideas using the Copyright Act.”).
“Copyright law, even as it relates to computer programs, has never before offered monopoly protection for
ideas, processes, and functions. This inconsistency is a warning sign that lawmakers have over-restricted
reverse engineering.” Id. at 326.
44
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
45
Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695,
717–18 (2011) (“Nevertheless, the exemption has operated in the context of P2P file sharing to negate the
scalable enforcement mechanism that notice and takedown provides. Inasmuch as P2P file sharing shifts
the locus of infringing activity from the storage function to the transmission function, it places such activity
beyond the knowledge and control of the ISP and thus beyond the reach of the enforcement scheme created
by § 512(c).”).
46
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
47
Id. at 1356; see About Wiley, JOHN WILEY & SONS, http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id301695.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
42
43
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Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd[.] All rights reserved.
This book is authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle
East only and may not be exported out of these territories. Exportation from
or importation of this book to another region without the Publisher’s
authorization is illegal and is a violation of the Publisher’s rights. The
Publisher may take legal action to enforce its rights. . . .48
¶18

Kirtsaeng, a Thai national, studied abroad in the United States and noticed the price
difference between textbooks sold in the United States and the same textbooks sold in
Thailand. 49 While studying in the United States, Kirtsaeng instructed his family and friends
to buy textbooks from local Thai bookstores and ship the textbooks to him in the United
States. 50 He then sold the books, reimbursed his family and friends, and kept the profits.51
In 2008, Wiley sued Kirtsaeng in federal court for copyright infringement. 52
¶19
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court held in favor of Kirtsaeng. 53 Justice Breyer
delivered the majority opinion, Justice Kagan issued a concurring opinion, and Justice
Ginsburg dissented. 54 Although each opinion weighed the legal effects on publishers and
purchasers, the opinions varied as to the realistic consequences of limiting the Doctrine’s
reach and the proper application of conflicting statutory language. 55 Taken together, these
opinions demonstrate a clear need for a more flexible rule that better balances conflicting
interests.
1. Majority Opinion
¶20

Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer held that the Doctrine permits selling
foreign-printed secondhand books in the United States, regardless of § 602’s conflicting
importation restrictions. 56 The Court relied on Quality King Distributers v. L’anza, where
it found that the § 602 importation limitations did not apply to previously exported U.S.printed books that were subsequently imported back to the United States.57 By extending
its reasoning in Quality King, the Court held that § 602’s reference to § 106 intended to
incorporate all of the § 106 exceptions, including the Doctrine. 58
¶21
The key factual difference between Kirtsaeng and Quality King concerned the
allegedly infringed books’ geographical origins. In Quality King, the books were printed
in the United States, whereas the books in Kirtsaeng were printed abroad. 59 Because of this
48
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting J. WALKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICS vi (Wiley Int’l
Student ed., 8th ed. 2008)).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1354.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1354–71 (majority opinion); id. at 1373–91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan’s balancing
is more indirect, as she agrees with the majority’s reasoning, but mentions that Congress might want to
intervene, suggesting she is skeptical about the actual result. Id. at 1372–73 (Kagan, J., concurring).
56
Id. at 1358–60 (majority opinion).
57
Id. at 1355; Quality King Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
58
Quality King Distribs., 523 U.S. at 144.
59
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355.
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geographic distinction, the Kirtsaeng Court’s focus turned to what Congress intended by
including § 109’s reference to “lawfully made under this title.” 60 Determining whether the
law was meant to include foreign-printed books required the Court to adopt either a
geography-based or non-geography-based reading of § 109. 61 The geography-based
reading would apply § 109 only to those books made in the geographic jurisdiction of the
United States, 62 while the non-geography-based reading would interpret “lawfully made
under” to mean “in compliance with,” thus extending the Doctrine to books published
abroad. 63 The majority adopted the non-geography-based reading. 64 As a result, because
Wiley’s Asian subsidiary had permission to print the books, the foreign-produced books
were “lawfully made under this title” and subject to the Doctrine, making Kirtsaeng’s
actions legal. 65
¶22
Beyond matters of statutory interpretation, the majority referenced the impact a
geographical reading could have on libraries, used-book sellers, and museums, among
others. 66 For instance, the Court imagined an onerous process requiring libraries to track
down and receive author permission for every foreign-printed book in their collections
before being able to lawfully lend such books. 67 Seeking to avoid this result, and bolstered
by their holding in Quality King, the majority found that Kirtsaeng had not infringed
Wiley’s copyright. 68 But by granting the Doctrine extraterritorial application, the Kirtsaeng
majority’s interpretation essentially gutted § 602(a)(1), taking away one of the few
advantages print publishers have left in this digital age.
2. Justice Kagan’s Concurrence
¶23

Although Justice Kagan agreed with the majority’s reasoning and decision, she noted
that Kirtsaeng and Quality King, when read together, limited § 602(a)(1) to “a fairly
esoteric set of applications.” 69 Justice Kagan suggested this limitation did not result from
the Kirtsaeng majority’s faulty reasoning, but rather from the holding in Quality King.70
She clarified, however, that the solution to this problem should not be to “misconstrue
§ 109(a) in order to restore § 602(a)(1) to its purportedly rightful function,” but that
Congress should provide statutory guidance as to the correct interpretation of these
conflicting provisions. 71
3. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent

¶24

Justice Ginsburg began her opinion quoting United States v. American Trucking:
“[I]n the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe
Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1358.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1358–59.
66
Id. at 1364–65.
67
Id.
68
See id. at 1371.
69
Id. at 1372 (Kagan, J., concurring).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1373.
60
61

241

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2015

the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.” 72 Coupled with her criticism of
the Court’s “bold departure from Congress’[s] design,” Justice Ginsburg asserted that the
effects of a geography-based interpretation of § 109, which the Court cited as both “too
serious” and “too likely to come about,” were both unlikely to occur and outweighed by
the far more probable adverse impact on publishers. 73 For Justice Ginsburg, the practical
negative effects of the non-geography-based reading of “lawfully made under this title”
overshadowed the “largely imaginary” “parade of horribles” the majority described. 74
¶25
Justice Ginsburg also referenced the texts of §§ 106(3), 109, and 602(1), and the
reasoning behind Quality King—a decision in which she concurred. 75 Indeed, Quality King
strongly supported her interpretation of § 602:
If the author of [a] work gave the exclusive United States distribution
rights—enforceable under the Act—to the publisher of the United States
edition and the exclusive British distribution rights to the publisher of the
British edition, . . . presumably only those [copies] made by the publisher
of the United States edition would be “lawfully made under this title” within
the meaning of § 109(a). The First Sale Doctrine would not provide the
publisher of the British edition who decided to sell in the American market
with a defense to an action under § 602(a) . . . . 76
Justice Ginsburg criticized the Kirtsaeng majority for dismissing this language as “illconsidered dictum,” and noted that the Court’s unanimity in Quality King further bolstered
her § 602 interpretation. 77
¶26
The opinions in Kirtsaeng show how statutory interpretations can diverge as a result
of textual ambiguity. Rather than seeking a middle ground that would protect both
copyright holders and book lenders, the Court chose to side with the latter. 78 And while
Justice Ginsburg’s stance would protect publishers, it would nevertheless leave open the
remote possibility that libraries could face copyright infringement suits for circulating
foreign-produced books without authors’ consents. 79 The Court missed an opportunity to
adopt a functionalist approach that would not only find Kirtsaeng’s actions illegal, but also
protect libraries acting in good faith from the “parade of horribles” the majority described.
B.
¶27

Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc.

On its face, Capitol Records v. ReDigi—an ongoing case before the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York—seems unrelated to the outcome in
Kirtsaeng. 80 But, if the issues decided in summary judgment are affirmed, 81 this rigid,
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542
(1940)).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1374.
76
Id. at 1375 (quoting Quality King Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 148 (1998)).
77
Id. at 1376.
78
See id. at 1364 (majority opinion).
79
See id. at 1386 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
80
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
81
Id.
72
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formalist application of copyright law could prompt seismic changes in digital media,
especially when read in tandem with Kirtsaeng. Moreover, as copyrighted digital media
becomes more prevalent, the ReDigi decision could have extensive influence as courts
inevitably face analogous scenarios.
¶28
ReDigi addressed “whether a digital music file, lawfully made and purchased, may
be resold by its owner through ReDigi under the First Sale Doctrine.” 82 The court held that
the Doctrine did not apply. 83 ReDigi is an online marketplace that allows users to trade
iTunes files with other ReDigi users by uploading their files to ReDigi’s cloud. 84 Before a
user can upload a track, however, ReDigi screens the track to make sure it is a lawfully
purchased iTunes file. 85 Files ripped from CDs or acquired by means other than iTunes are
not eligible for the service. 86 Once uploaded to the cloud, the track is deleted from the
originating computer, permitting the user to access the file but only from the cloud.87
Although the files are not deleted automatically—users must do so themselves—ReDigi
suspends accounts for those who do not comply. 88 Thus, when a user decides to trade one
of his uploaded tracks for a new track, he loses access to the original track. 89 Because only
one copy of a particular music file exists upon both upload and download, ReDigi argued
that the service refrained from impermissibly copying an author’s copyrighted work.
¶29
But the district court was not convinced. 90 The court focused on the physical, rather
than the digital, aspects of file transferring. 91 The court stated that, for purposes of applying
the Copyright Act, “reproduction occurs when a copyrighted work is fixed in a new
material object.” 92 The court further asserted that “when a user downloads a digital music
file or ‘digital sequence’ to his ‘hard disk,’ the file is ‘reproduce[d]’ on a new phonorecord
within the meaning of the Copyright Act.” 93 Therefore, because “[i]t is simply impossible
that the same ‘material object’ can be transferred over the internet,” the digital transmission
of a music file necessarily creates a new phonorecord, and the Doctrine does not protect
the selling of copies of purchased phonorecords. 94
¶30
The court noted, however, that selling the hard drive or iPod upon which the digital
file was first downloaded would be permissible in the same way that selling a used CD
would be permissible. 95 While acknowledging that this was potentially “more onerous”
than reselling a CD, the court believed the result was “hardly absurd” because “the First
Id. at 648.
Id. at 660.
84
Id. at 645. Uploading files to ReDigi’s cloud is essentially just uploading them to ReDigi’s servers.
Eric Griffith, What Is Cloud Computing?, PC MAG. (Mar. 13, 2013),
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp (“In the simplest terms, cloud computing means storing
and accessing data and programs over the Internet instead of your computer's hard drive. The cloud is just a
metaphor for the Internet.”).
85
See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 646.
90
Id. at 650.
91
Id. at 649.
92
Id. at 648 (emphasis in original).
93
Id. at 649.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 656.
82
83
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Sale Doctrine was enacted in a world where the ease and speed of data transfer could not
have been imagined.” 96
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
A.

How Kirtsaeng and ReDigi Could Quicken the Death of Print Media

¶31

The decline of print media is apparent. Bookstores across the country are shuttering
their windows and print newspapers are becoming obsolete. 97 With the rise of iPads and
other tablets, fewer consumers are purchasing hardcopy books and magazines. 98 In only a
few short decades, printed books could very well go the way of the vinyl record—only
owned and read by true bibliophiles and collectors.
¶32
Kirtsaeng and ReDigi have potentially accelerated this process, especially when
interpreted together. As Justice Ginsburg mentioned in her dissent, gutting § 602 could
have disastrous effects on international publishing. 99
¶33
With respect to textbooks, international pricing could increase significantly. In order
to deter the importation of less-expensive foreign versions of their books to the United
States, publishers may be forced to raise prices in foreign markets. In many of these
countries, most individuals would be unable to afford these increased costs. For example,
the average law school textbook in the United States costs approximately $200, which
amounts to nearly half the average monthly salary for those living in urban China and more
than double the average monthly salary of those living in India. 100 By comparison,
adjusting these numbers to the median income in Chicago, this would be similar to charging
approximately $2,000 or $8,500, respectively, for a law school textbook. 101
¶34
Higher books prices abroad, in turn, would likely cause an increase in counterfeits.
Expensive items that can be reproduced easily and cheaply attract counterfeiters.
Moreover, books are especially easy to copy—one original purchase can produce
innumerable copies for resale. For example, on Amazon.com, The Textbook of Spinal

Id.
American Bookshops in Decline, Beyond Borders, THE ECONOMIST (May 21, 2011, 5:39 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2011/03/american_bookshops_decline; Michaelle Bond, For
Newspapers, A Less Than Daily Future, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June–July 2012, available at
http://ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=5342 (“Most of the 38 news executives surveyed in a Pew Research
Center report released in March predicted that, in five years or so, daily papers would be printed less
frequently, maybe just on Sunday.”).
98
Bond, supra note 97.
99
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1373–74 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100
China’s 2011 Average Salaries Revealed, CHINA DAILY (July 6, 2012),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-07/06/content_15555503.htm; India’s Monthly Average Income
Rose to Rs 5,130 in 2011–12, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-01-31/news/36658764_1_cent-current-prices-capitaincome.
101
Area Median Income Chart, CITY OF CHICAGO,
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/area_median_incomeamichart.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013). Numbers based off dividing median annual income for one person by twelve, then dividing
by two for China comparison and multiplying by two for India comparison. Numbers rounded to nearest
$500.
96
97
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Surgery sells for $343.99, a 20% savings from the list price. 102 In contrast, on a popular
Chinese website, TaoBao.com, a counterfeit copy of the same textbook sells for $29.30. 103
¶35
Thus, on the one hand, employing identical pricing models in the United States and
foreign markets is clearly unsustainable. Yet at the same time, if cheaper, foreign-produced
textbooks flood the U.S. market, publishers will be forced to lower prices to compete. In
short, U.S. textbook publishers are facing a potentially industry-altering dilemma.
¶36
But ReDigi—if it becomes binding precedent—could provide a simple remedy for
publishers: transition to digital textbooks. By eliminating costs associated with print books,
such as production and storage costs, publishers would be able to lower prices and thus
avoid pricing themselves out of foreign markets. Additionally, moving to digital textbooks
would reduce competition from the used-textbook market. Unlike a print textbook, a digital
textbook cannot be sold separately from the iPad to which it was originally downloaded.
Assuming most tablet owners are unwilling to sell their tablets at prices that used-book
shoppers are willing to pay, an influx of digital textbooks would substantially diminish the
used-textbook market. And because of this reduced competition from used-textbook
sellers, publishers would be under less pressure to produce new editions as frequently,
resulting in additional cost savings. Thus, while Kirtsaeng might initially appear proconsumer, its effects might actually culminate in a panacea for publishers.
B.
¶37

Contrary to Its Intent, Kirtsaeng Will Harm Libraries and Used-Book Sellers

The Kirtsaeng majority attempted to avoid interpreting § 109 in a way that would
negatively affect libraries. The majority discussed at length the briefs submitted by the
American Library Association and other book-lending advocates, and how limiting
“lawfully made under this title” to a geography-based interpretation would expose libraries
to copyright infringement lawsuits. 104 While it seems unlikely that parties holding decadesold foreign copyrights would begin scouring U.S. libraries in order to sue for copyright
infringement, 105 § 602 nevertheless applies to libraries. 106 But the limitations in § 602 do
not apply to “importation by or for an organization operated for scholarly, educational, or
religious purposes and not for private gain.” 107 This means that U.S. libraries are free to
circulate foreign-copyrighted books imported for library use. In contrast, foreigncopyrighted books imported for other reasons and subsequently donated to libraries are
subject to § 602’s abrogation of the Doctrine. Practically, however, the likelihood of a

102
The Textbook of Spinal Surgery, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Textbook-Spinal-SurgeryKeith-Bridwell/dp/0781786207 (last visited Nov. 28, 2014).
103
The listed item has since been removed, but counterfeits on Alibaba’s Taobao.com are common. See
Sophia Yan, Alibaba Has a Major Counterfeit Problem, CNN MONEY (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/11/technology/alibaba-counterfeit-ipo/ (“In its IPO prospectus, Alibaba
warned potential investors that it could come under fire for alleged counterfeit activity, as it did between
2008 and 2011, when the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative labeled Taobao as a ‘notorious
marketplace’ with ‘widespread availability of counterfeit and pirated goods.’”).
104
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1364–66 (majority opinion).
105
Id. at 1389 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Most telling in this regard, no court it appears, has been called
upon to answer any of the court’s ‘horribles’ in an actual case.”).
106
17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3)(C) (2012).
107
Id.
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¶39

¶40

¶41

foreign copyright holder not only discovering that a copy of his book ended up in an
American library improperly, but then also deciding to sue, is slight. 108
While the Kirtsaeng majority’s decision saved libraries from this unlikely threat, it
might have exposed them to a far greater one. If ReDigi becomes binding precedent, how
can libraries adapt in a world where printed books are increasingly becoming obsolete? At
first blush, the solution seems clear: rent e-books. But if ReDigi and modern e-book
licensing practices take hold, libraries will likely find the transition to e-book lending
difficult.
Currently, libraries must enter into licensing agreements if they choose to rent ebooks. 109 Instead of owning copies of e-books, libraries pay subscription fees to publishers
and are subject to these licensing agreements’ terms, such as geographical restrictions on
renting specific e-books. 110 As opposed to buying one copy of a book and renting it to
library-goers indefinitely, libraries must not only pay initial subscription fees for e-books,
but also pay to renew an e-book license upon its expiration.
As e-books become more popular, this licensing system will likely impose further
burdens on libraries. Publishers are increasingly concerned about monetizing e-book
distribution methods, prompting various licensing restrictions on library-rented e-books.111
For example, HarperCollins limits the number of times a particular copy of an e-book can
be checked out to twenty-six. 112 Additionally, if the ReDigi logic finds widespread
acceptance, publishers will gain more bargaining power when negotiating with libraries
because, in light of the financial benefits of licensing discussed supra Part IV(a), fewer
incentives would exist for publishers to agree to a system where libraries can purchase,
rather than license, e-books.
As far as Kirtsaeng helps speed the decline of print media, without a more flexible
Doctrine, the decision leaves libraries in a precarious position. It seems unlikely that an
owner of a copyright in a foreign-produced book would pursue legal action against a library
for lending a copy of her book without first obtaining consent. However, the numerous
financial benefits stemming from e-book licensing agreements may prompt publishers to
be more protective of their rights in digital media, posing a far more realistic and costly
burden on libraries.
C.

¶42

[2015

Kirtsaeng and ReDigi Will Exacerbate the Problems of Counterfeiting and Piracy

Prohibiting the sale of used digital files will uniquely affect the market for digitalmedia products. Traditionally, retail purchasers buy a book or CD at full price and then sell
it at a significantly reduced, used-good market rate. 113 This not only permits a buyer to
recoup a portion of the initial price when he no longer wants an item, but also allows those

See id.
Dahleen Glanton, Publisher Puts New Limits on Library E-Books, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 6, 2011),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-03-06/news/ct-met-library-e-books-20110306_1_e-booksharpercollins-library-users.
110
Benedicte Page & Helen Pidd, Ebook Restrictions Leave Libraries Facing Virtual Lockout, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/oct/26/libraries-ebook-restrictions.
111
Glanton, supra note 109.
112
Id.
113
See Cary T. Platkin, Comment, In Search of a Compromise to the Music Industry’s Used CD
Dilemma, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 509, 525 (1995).
108
109
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who either cannot afford or are unwilling to pay full price the option to purchase the used
good. 114 Under ReDigi, however, selling used digital files becomes prohibitively
expensive. 115 For example, few people are willing to sell a computer or iPad because they
no longer want a Lady Gaga album purchased in 2009.
¶43
Studies on the psychology of consumers who buy counterfeit or pirated products
show how stifling the used-good market might affect consumer activity. With counterfeit,
tangible goods, buyers understand they are obtaining a lower quality product, but choose
to purchase the counterfeit version because it costs less than the genuine product. 116 The
difference between consumers who buy counterfeit goods versus legitimate goods is
usually that a shopper’s economic concerns outweigh her aversion to risk. 117 Thus, if a
counterfeit’s quality increases while the price of the legitimate good rises, more consumers
will be inclined to buy a counterfeit instead of the legitimate good.
¶44
Moreover, with most pirated digital goods, people receive the exact same product
without paying market price. As a result, digital copyright holders offset these financial
losses by increasing market prices, which in effect penalizes those consumers who act
lawfully. 118 Yet many choose to ignore this disparate consumer burden, instead justifying
piracy as a response to wealthy copyright holders’ demands for remuneration. 119 Referred
to as equity theory, commentators identify this concept as one of the primary causes of
piracy 120: “[W]ith regard to digital media, . . . pirates perceive the prices for digital goods
to be high, and view this as inequitable, particularly given the economic success of some
of the copyright holders. Pirates use this disparity to justify their illegal behavior.”121
Further, the intangible nature of digital goods emboldens those adhering to this rationale
because pirating imposes few obvious costs. Pirating does not deprive anyone from
Id. at 528.
See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (suggesting the
permissibility of selling the hardware upon which a digital file was downloaded).
116
Gail Tom et al., Consumer Demand for Counterfeit Goods, 15 PSYCHOL. & MKTG. 405, 412 (1998)
(“Consumers who stated a preference for counterfeit goods indicated greater satisfaction with the
durability/quality of legitimate versions of the product than with the counterfeit version and greater
satisfaction with the prize [sic] of counterfeit goods than legitimate goods.”).
117
Id. at 414–16.
118
See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF SOUND RECORDING
PIRACY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 14 (2007), available at
http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf. Piracy’s impact extends to all corners of
the U.S. economy:
114
115

[T]he U.S. sound recording industries are now sustaining approximately $5.33 billion in
losses as a result of global and U.S. piracy. In addition, U.S. retailers are losing another
$1.04 billion. These estimates suggest total “direct” losses to all U.S. industries from
music piracy that exceed $6.37 billion. These direct losses then cascade through the rest
of the U.S. economy and the losses of economic output, jobs and employee earnings
“multiply.” Based on the analyses set forth in this paper, because of music piracy, the
U.S. economy loses a total of $12.5 billion in economic output each year.
Id. at 14–15.
119
Charles W. L. Hill, Digital Piracy: Causes, Consequences, and Strategic Response, 24 ASIA PAC. J.
MGMT. 9, 12 (2007).
120
Id.
121
Id.
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receiving the same file, and for most media-users, any monetary impact seems
infinitesimal. Ultimately, it is easy for many to believe, albeit erroneously, that digital
piracy is a victimless crime.
¶45
These factors combine to create an environment where black markets can flourish.
Coupled with the oft-subscribed to equity theory, if quality and risk are all that typically
keep consumers from buying counterfeit goods, what will happen when quality increases,
risk decreases, and companies refuse to allow those who have played by the rules to resell
their goods? Discussed infra Part V, a more flexible Doctrine could alleviate some of these
tensions and potentially reduce incentives for black markets to develop.
V. A SOLUTION
¶46

When applied to modern technology, the Doctrine’s flaws are clear. How to resolve
these shortcomings is far less apparent. Part V discusses the necessary flexibility of an
adequate solution, and analyzes the considerations and challenges to crafting this malleable
rule.
A.

¶47

A more flexible rule governing copyright law is needed to rectify the problems with
the current Doctrine. The ReDigi court aptly noted: “[T]he [F]irst [S]ale [D]octrine was
enacted in a world where the ease and speed of data transfer could not have been
imagined.” 122 In short, the Doctrine is outdated. Although applying the old rule to both
print and digital media raises various concerns, this Note does not argue for the Doctrine’s
abandonment. Instead, Congress should draft a rule based on intent and practical effect
rather than the technology available at the time. With technology’s increasing prevalence
in daily life, media-users need to maintain some semblance of control over their media
property. But a new, rigid rule granting media-users control over digital property could
easily become as analogously unworkable as the current Doctrine. Thus, an adequate
solution must be sufficiently flexible to apply consistently, regardless of the type of
technology in question.
B.

¶48

The Need for a More Flexible Rule

Considerations and Challenges

Developing a more flexible rule requires balancing various interests. On the one
hand, the rule needs to be flexible enough to adapt to changing technology. On the other
hand, the rule needs to provide predictability, such that copyright holders and media-users
have a clear understanding of their rights and responsibilities. This Section explores the
intent, effect, and fairness considerations that Congress should take into account when
revising the Doctrine, as well as the challenges of drafting a rule that adapts to quickly
changing technology.
1. Intent

¶49

Two aspects of intent are pertinent to drafting a more suitable rule: congressional
intent and the intent of the person violating the law. Congress needs to make its intent
122
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textually clear in the law itself, which in turn will shape how the law is applied.
Additionally, the law should include a culpability element, aiming to punish those who
knowingly exploit the law to take advantage of copyright owners, not those who use digital
products in accordance with traditional fair-use standards.
¶50
Although Congress intended the provisions of the DMCA to “serve as technological
adjuncts to the exclusive rights granted by copyright law,” 123 the DMCA prevents certain
uses of circumvention technologies that otherwise constitute fair use. 124 If the law
considered intent, however, media-users would no longer be liable for innocent conduct
and anti-circumvention technology would actually improve. Although Congress attempted
to draft the DMCA in a manner that would not “chill[] legitimate scientific encryption
research,” the exemption for beneficial research is criticized by many “for being both too
narrow and too vague.” 125 By permitting independent researchers to work more freely on
breaking anti-circumvention software, software companies would gain a better
understanding of how pirates exploit their software. Software companies would then be
able to improve anti-circumvention technology accordingly.
¶51
This culpability element would not negate liability for those using anticircumvention software to pirate digital media. Crucially, this would allow courts to judge
the merits of a case without having to caution against negatively affecting unrelated parties
acting in good faith. For instance, the Court would likely have reached a different result in
Kirtsaeng if a culpability requirement had been in place. The Court could have found
Kirtsaeng, who was clearly looking to profit by exploiting Wiley’s international
distribution and pricing, to be in violation of the law, without fearing that the holding would
negatively affect libraries. Unforeseen and complex issues will undoubtedly surface as
technology progresses, which necessitates a sufficiently flexible rule to effectuate the
Doctrine’s intent and provide adequate protection for media-users and copyright holders.
2. Effect
¶52

Any revisions to the Doctrine need to weigh the potential effects on copyright
owners, especially whether the resulting societal benefits will offset the reduced incentive
to innovate. After all, Congress’s constitutional mandate is “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.” 126 Thus, the law should not be over-inclusive, especially for
trivial matters. For example, the law should provide for a different outcome in Kirtsaeng
without causing libraries to worry about the origins of every foreign book in their
collections. But at the same time, trivial matters can add up, specifically when seemingly
inconsequential effects accumulate to inhibit a law’s efficacy. Stated differently, the law
needs to provide sufficient copyright protection to prevent the steady attrition of authors’
exclusive rights.
¶53
But finding this balance poses myriad challenges. If courts allow copyright holders
to pursue trivial claims, a quagmire of copyright infringement lawsuits would likely result,
cluttering court dockets and stymieing judicial economy. The complexities of rapidly
123
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998 U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE SUMMARY 3 (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
124
Liu, supra note 39, at 509–10.
125
Liu, supra note 39, at 509–10, 511 n.37.
126
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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changing technologies exacerbate this problem, where seemingly insignificant claims
might later have unanticipated and sweeping consequences. Additionally, courts would
need to approach each claim on a case-by-case basis, calculating the likely effects on the
copyright holder in each instance. Consequently, with numerous courts across the country
interpreting the new copyright statute, developing a cohesive body of case law will be
difficult—that is, in the initial absence of Supreme Court guidance—without a sufficiently
explicit statutory mandate. Indeed, because of the fact-specific nature of copyright
infringement lawsuits and the challenges of interpreting the law in light of evolving
technology, it might take many years of applying the new Doctrine before judicial
consensus exists as to what constitutes a trivial versus problematic claim. Given these
points, resolving the Doctrine’s shortcomings likely requires sufficiently tailored
legislation that courts interpret in a functionalist, rather than formalist, manner.
3. Fairness
¶54

A revised Doctrine also needs to balance competing fairness interests between
copyright holders and media-users. Although recalibrating intellectual property law to
address changed circumstances often requires weighing various fairness considerations, 127
digital media’s uniquely replicative nature distinguishes it from products with qualitatively
distinct forms. As digital technology improves, fewer discernable differences in quality
between “new” and “used” media exist. For example, while someone might choose to buy
a new CD rather than a used one for fear of purchasing a scratched disc, this problem does
not arise in the digital music context.
¶55
Because a digital file can be copied ad infinitum without losing its quality, treating
digital-media resellers like other resellers is unfair to copyright holders in digital media.128
Few incentives exist to buy music new when a purchaser can get the same music file at a
significant discount the next day. Accordingly, many argue that restricting the Doctrine to
non-digital goods aligns with the Doctrine’s intent:
[T]he purpose of the first-sale exception is not to give unlimited ability to
individuals to distribute their copies of a work, but rather to permit
individuals to distribute copies they lawfully own when such distribution
would not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work or adversely
affect the legitimate interests of the copyright owner in that work. 129
This argument clearly makes sense in some cases, such as those situations imagined by §
109(b), in which the owner of a particular copy rents that copy to others for commercial
gain. 130 On the other hand, prohibiting a consumer from reselling a purchased good solely
because it exists on a different medium conflicts with the fundamental fairness

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); RESTATEMENT THIRD OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 (1995)
(describing the affirmative defense of fair use in trademark law if “the actor has used the term fairly and in
good faith”).
128
Keith Kupferschmid, Lost in Cyberspace: The Digital Demise of the First-Sale Doctrine, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 825, 848 (1998).
129
Id. at 847.
130
See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
127
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considerations the original Doctrine embodies. 131 From the album owner’s perspective, the
sale is the same whether the album is on a vinyl record, CD, or an MP3. An individual
purchasing a digital song is not asking for unlimited distribution rights to that song, but
rather the opportunity to resell the original product as if she had bought the song on a
tangible medium.
¶56
Additionally, restricting the Doctrine’s application to non-digital goods would inhibit
access to digital media for those who cannot afford to pay full price. And, as discussed
supra Part IV(c), piracy increases when consumers feel they are being treated unfairly. For
a revised law to avoid these issues, it will need to incentivize parties to both create and
purchase copyrighted material, while allowing consumers to buy and sell copyrighted
goods on the secondhand market.
C.

A Recent Example: Bowman v. Monsanto

Bowman presented the Supreme Court with an interesting example of how advancing
technology raises issues that were unanticipated when a law was first drafted. While the
Court’s decision does not directly address copyright law, it nevertheless illustrates how a
more flexible rule might mitigate problems resulting from the application of old law to new
technology, specifically by considering intent, effect, and fairness.
¶58
In Bowman, a farmer had purchased genetically modified soybeans from
Monsanto. 132 These “Roundup Ready” beans are resistant to certain herbicides, allowing
farmers to use herbicides on crops to kill weeds without harming the crops. 133 Farmers buy
the beans under a special license, which permits them to harvest the beans only once. 134
Under the license, farmers can sell the beans, but not replant them. 135 Although Bowman,
the farmer, adhered to these terms in the past, he bought seeds from a local grain elevator
where he knew other farmers had deposited already-harvested Roundup Ready beans. 136
Bowman then planted these beans, applied the herbicide, and collected the seeds from the
surviving plants. 137 In this way, he was able to harvest multiple crops of Roundup Ready
beans without purchasing them through Monsanto. 138 When Monsanto discovered this
practice, it sued Bowman for patent infringement. 139
¶59
Bowman raised the affirmative defense of patent exhaustion, claiming that Monsanto
could not control his use of the beans because he had acquired them through a prior
authorized sale. 140 More specifically, Bowman argued that he had not made the new
¶57

131
“The doctrine prevents copyright owners from restraining the free alienability of goods.” J.D.
Schneider, Kirtsaeng: Copyright’s “First Sale” Doctrine and Foreign-Manufactured Goods, COLO. LAW.,
Dec. 2013, at 69.
132
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764–65 (2013). “Under the doctrine of patent
exhaustion, the authorized sale of a patented article gives the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, a right to
use or resell that article. Such a sale, however, does not allow the purchaser to make new copies of the
patented invention.” Id. at 1764.
133
Id. at 1764.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 1765.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.at 1766.
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soybeans; rather, the beans had “naturally self-replicate[d],” creating replicas of
Monsanto’s patented beans. 141 As a result, Bowman claimed he had used the beans in
accordance with Monsanto’s license agreement because their reproduction was merely
incidental to his otherwise permissible use thereof. 142
¶60
But the Court disagreed, stating that Bowman’s intentional actions were precisely
how one would make a new plant. 143 The Court noted that eating, selling, or feeding the
beans to livestock was allowed under the patent exhaustion doctrine. 144 Bowman infringed
Monsanto’s patent by actively sorting through and determining which beans were the
patented ones and then planting and harvesting the patented beans to avoid buying them
for the following harvest season. 145 The Court found that “the exhaustion doctrine does
not enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s
permission.” 146 The Court further reasoned that if patent exhaustion was a viable defense,
Monsanto’s patent would provide few benefits. 147 While Monsanto would receive
compensation for the first harvest, farmers would have no reason to continue buying from
Monsanto. 148 By continuing to use the licensing agreements, farmers benefited from the
beans and Monsanto was compensated for its innovation through additional sales of
Roundup Ready. 149
¶61
Perhaps most important, the Court explicitly limited its holding. 150 The Court
recognized the unique nature of the beans and that “such inventions are becoming ever
more prevalent, complex, and diverse. In another case, the article’s self-replication might
occur outside the purchaser’s control. Or it might be a necessary but incidental step in using
the item for another purpose.” 151 The Court acknowledged the challenges of applying static
legal doctrines to modern technology and the danger of overly broad opinions producing
absurd results. 152 While this case involved a patent, the Court’s analysis nevertheless
illustrates what a court should consider when addressing intellectual property rights in new
technology. Applying a similar approach to copyright cases should produce similarly just
results for both copyright holders and consumers.
D.
¶62

A Functionalist Solution

Both the Court’s application of patent law and the type of licensing agreement used
in Bowman provide guidance in the digital media context. Analogous to easily copied
digital files, the Roundup Ready beans in Bowman could self-replicate, which prompted
Monsanto to devise an agreement restricting the use of the seeds after the first harvest. 153
The Court, recognizing the nuances of this innovative technology, refrained from
Id. at 1768–69.
See id. at 1768–69.
143
Id. at 1766–67.
144
Id. at 1766.
145
Id. at 1766–67.
146
Id.at 1766.
147
Id.at 1767.
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Id.
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Id. at 1768
150
Id. at 1769.
151
Id.
152
See id.
153
See id. at 1764–65.
141
142
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overextending its decision, focusing instead on Bowman’s intentionally exploitative
conduct. 154 And most pertinent to our analysis, the Court acknowledged that necessary but
incidental copies might be permissible in certain circumstances, which mirrors the
incidental copies necessary to selling used digital files through an ReDigi-like platform. 155
However, unlike the Court in Bowman, the ReDigi court adopted a formalist approach to
find that the incidental digital copies violated copyright law. 156
¶63
Further, Monsanto’s licensing agreement provides a potential model for agreements
between digital copyright holders and media-users. For example, online music could be
sold with a license that allows media-users to sell both the digital files and the incidental
copies necessary to transferring a song to other consumers. Similar to the reasoning behind
fair use and copyright term limits, these licensing arrangements would provide a workable
framework that both protects copyright holders from exploitative conduct and promotes
the Doctrine’s fundamental principles. Specifically, a license could allow for general fair
use of the digital files, while prohibiting owners from reselling the digital files for a certain
length of time. Following this reselling-prohibition period, media-users would be permitted
to sell the digital file through a system similar to the one found in ReDigi, provided that
media-users delete the original files.
¶64
Regardless of any licensing arrangements, the most important aspect of any solution
hinges on whether courts adopt a functionalist approach when applying the Doctrine. The
formalistic application of antiquated laws is bound to produce absurd results. Copyright
law needs to be sufficiently flexible to adapt to new circumstances and specific situations.
In Bowman, for instance, the farmer’s intent was clear in that he devised a plan to reproduce
the patented seeds and reap the benefits of Roundup Ready without paying Monsanto
additional compensation. 157 The Court reasoned that planting the seeds amounted to
“making” new seeds. 158 But what if Bowman had simply bought the seeds from the grain
elevator and planted them without spraying the herbicide? In that case, he would have no
way of knowing which, if any, of the plants resulted from Roundup Ready seeds, and thus
would not have received any unfair benefits. In other words, would the Court still reason
that he “made” the seeds?
¶65
Only a dynamic approach can hope to resolve this inevitable uncertainty. Courts need
to be able to adapt in this ever-evolving context and apply the law fairly, equitably, and
predictably. With technology’s exponential progression, a rigid, formalist approach to
copyright law likely precludes the availability of an adequate solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
¶66

The First Sale Doctrine is too rigid in the face of modern technology. A formalist
application of the Doctrine produces absurd results, harming both copyright holders and
consumers. A more flexible rule and functionalist approach is needed as technology
continues to advance in ways that could not have been predicted when the Doctrine was
first introduced. By considering intent and effect, and taking a more functionalist approach
See id.
See id.
156
Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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to new issues arising in copyright law, courts can apply the Doctrine in a way that is more
flexible, fair, and consistent; one that sufficiently balances the needs of consumers and
copyright holders as technology continues to progress in innumerable ways.
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